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Zollo: Constitutional Law: School Has Broad Discretion to Prohibit Offen

CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SCHOOL HAS BROAD
DISCRETION TO PROHIBIT OFFENSIVE
STUDENT SPEECH
Bethel School DistrictNo. 403 v. Fraser,106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986)
Respondent student delivered a campaign speech nominating a fellow student at a voluntary high school assembly.' The speech contained
sexual innuendoes that evoked varied reactions from the audience.2
In response, school officials suspended respondent for violating the
school's disciplinary code 3 and removed his name from the graduation
speaker list.4 Respondent filed suit in federal district court alleging

infringement of his first amendment right to freedom of speech 5 and
seeking injunctive relief and damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.6 The
district court awarded respondent damages.7 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the first amendment protected respondent from
punishment because the speech was neither obscene nor disruptive.,
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
1. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 3162 (1986). Students were
required to attend either the assembly or a study hall. Id.
2. Id. Respondent gave the following speech:
I know a man who is firm - he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his shirt, his
character is firm - but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel,
is firm.
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If necessary he'll
take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn't attack things in spurts - he
drives hard, pushing and pushing until finally - he succeeds.
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end - even the climax, for each and
every one of you.
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president - he'll never come between you
and the best our high school can be.
Id. at 3167 (Brennan, J., concurring). School faculty observed that some students yelled, others
simulated the speech through gestures, and others seemed embarrassed. Id. at 3162.
3. Id. The Bethel High School disciplinary code prohibits "[clonduct which materially and
substantially interferes with the educational process . . . including the use of obscene, profane
language or gestures." Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 3163. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
6. 106 S. Ct. at 3163.
7. Id.
8. Fraser v. Bethel School Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1365 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106
S. Ct. 3159 (1986). The Ninth Circuit also asserted that denying respondent's speech first
193
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HELD, the first amendment did not prohibit school officials from
disciplining students for offensive and indecent speech at school functions. 9
Whether the Constitution's framers intended the first amendment
to protect all expression is uncertain. 10 History indicates that the framers were primarily concerned with combating sedition and prior restraints of the press.1 In this century, however, the Supreme Court
has maintained that broad protection of speech preserves the free and
open discourse necessary in a democracy.' Thus, the government must
demonstrate a significant or compelling interest to justify even reason13
able time, place, and manner restrictions on public expression.
Freedom of speech also promotes the development of an individual's
personal ideas, a second justification for broad protection of first
amendment rights. 14 Because of a democracy's regard for individual

amendment protection increased the risk of "cementing white middle class standards" into the
public school system. Id. at 1363.
9. 106 S. Ct. at 3166.
10. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 66 (1982) (quoting
L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION vii (1960)) ("the generation which adopted.., the Bill
of Rights did not believe in a broad scope of freedom of expression"). But see Mayton, Seditious
Libel and the Lost Guaranteeof a Freedom of Expression, 84 COLUm. L. REV. 91, 123 (1984)
(citing constitutional convention discussions that show some framers were concerned with protecting opinions, thoughts and speech).
11. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (primary purpose of the first amendment
was to prevent government from imposing restraints on the press); Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH
IN THE UNITED STATES 19-20 (1941) (framers intended via the first amendment to abolish
common law of sedition).
12. Perhaps the most eloquent articulation of this value is found in Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1926) (overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969)): "[F]reedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth. . . public discussion is a political
duty and... should be a fundamental principle of the American government." Id. at 375; see
also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (freedom of speech "wvill ultimately produce a
more capable citizenry and more perfect polity"); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S.
367, 390 (1969) (speech about public affairs is an essential element of self-government).
13. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (198:3)
(reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible if "narrowly tailored to serve
a significant government interest"). In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the
Court cited the test for reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in the school environment,
as whether the restriction was 'narrowly tailored to further [a school's] compelling interest" in
an undisturbed educational process. Id. at 116-19.
14. For a general discussion of the value of speech conduct to an individual, see Baker,
Scope of the FirstAmendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 990-1040 (1978); see
also Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982) (free speech allows
an individual to achieve his full potential).
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welfare, as well as for the welfare of the collective, the Supreme Court
has extended the right of free speech to all persons protected by the
Constitution. 15 In recognition of the critical importance of this right,
the Supreme Court has excluded only three categories of speech obscenity,16 libel absent actual malice, 17 and fighting words", - from
first amendment protection.
The Supreme Court extended first amendment protection to student expression in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District. 9 In Tinker, school officials suspended three students
because they wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War.20 The
Court characterized this symbolic act as akin to pure speech,
safeguarded by the first amendment.21 Although schools have a legitimate interest in undisturbed education, their power to proscribe student expression is not absolute. Absent a showing that the students'
action substantially interfered with classwork or the rights of others,
the Tinker Court held that prohibition of expression was not justified.2 3
Although student protest may cause classroom disturbances, these
risks are inherent in a free society.1 Because a school's role is not
only to educate, but also to prepare students for participation in a
free and open society, schools must not restrict student communication
unless the restriction is necessary to preserve order and the educational process.25

15. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 444-45 (1963) (first amendment applies to all persons
without regard to age, "race, creed, or political or religious affiliation").
16. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
17. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
18. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
19. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943), the Court prohibited a school from compelling a student to salute a flag. The Tinker
Court relied on Barnette for the general proposition that as preparers of the young for citizenship,
schools must scrupulously protect constitutional freedoms. 393 U.S. at 507. The Supreme Court
has extended other constitutional rights to students as well. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S.
Ct. 733 (1985) (fourth amendment applicable to student searches conducted by public school
officials); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (due process applicable to public school students).
20. 393 U.S. at 504, 508.
21. Id. at 505, 506. The Court asserted that students did not "shed their constitutional
rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." Id. at 506.
22. Id. at 511.
2:3. Id. at 514. One commentator maintains that this standard is too high for schools. See
Diamond, The First Ameizdment and Public Schools: The Case Against JudicialIntervention,
59 TEx. L. REv. 477, 497 (1981) ('The judiciary cannot know the extent to which any kind of
distraction during the course of the day interferes with learning.").
24. See 393 U.S. at 508-09.
25. See id. at 512, 513. For a discussion on the role free speech plays in a child's development
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The Supreme Court prohibited a state's restriction of offensive
words in Cohen v. California.26 In Cohen, petitioner violated a state
penal code provision prohibiting offensive conduct. 27 The petitioner
wore to the county courthouse a jacket proclaiming the words "Fuck
the Draft."2 The Cohen Court distinguished these offensive words
from unprotected obscene and fighting words. 29 Despite the presence
of children in a courtroom corridor, a state cannot automatically curtail
offensive speech.30 The Court rejected the contention that the state
could act as guardian of public morality and prohibit public use of
"offensive" words?1 In public, 32 unwilling recipients of speech may
turn away from such expression.?
The Cohen Court believed that California could not establish a
standard to determine what words were offensive.? The Court also

see Garvey, Childrenand the FirstAmendment, 57 TEx. L. REV. 321 (1979). Professor Garvey
argues that the right to freedom of expression: (1) provides training for participation in a
democracy, (2) aids in a search for knowledge and truth, and (3) contributes to the growth of
a child's autonomy and self-realization. Id. at 338. But see Diamond, supra note 23, at 506
(because schools normally operate on local rather than national basis, national constitutional
standard governing schools is inappropriate).
26. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
27. Id. at 16.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 20. The Court's first significant encounters with speech characterized as unprotected began with a series of cases involving protests against the draft and World War I. See,
e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (Court articulated the clear and present
danger test: state may prohibit those words that "are of such a nature as to bring about the
substantive evils... [the government].., has a right to prevent"). The standard for fighting
words was established in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (words which
by their "very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace"). The
Court's apparent justification for restraint of obscenity is the interest in protection of the moral
standards of the community. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The test for obscenity
was established as:
(a) whether "the average person applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
30. 403 U.S. at 21.
31. Id. at 22-23.
32. The distinction between offending someone in public and offending someone in the
privacy of his home originated in Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)
(homeowner permitted to stop mail delivery of erotic advertising to his home).
33. Id. at 21; see, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975) (drive-in
movie screen not so obtrusive that an unwilling individual could not avoid exposure to it).
34. 403 U.S. at 25. The Court perhaps recognized its own difficulties in defining obscenity.
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recognized a constitutional right protecting the emotive as well as
literal function of a word.3 Because of his choice of words, the message
the petitioner in Cohen sought to convey was that much more effective. 3 Permitting a state to repress words that help convey an idea
7
more effectively could lead a state to suppress unpopular views.
In FCC v. PacificaFoundation this fear of government suppression of ideas did not dissuade the Supreme Court from ruling against
a radio station for an offensive, although not obscene, broadcast.3 9 The
respondent station maintained that the broadcast was part of a pro-

gram satirizing society's attitude about particular words.40 The FCC,
acting on a complaint from a concerned father, emphasized that the
2:00 p.m. airing was easily accessible to children.4 1 Furthermore, because airwaves freely enter the home, children were especially vulnerable to the broadcast's offensive nature.4 2 Focusing on protecting
minors, the Court, in a plurality opinion, 4 expanded the constitutional
standard for indecency.- The new first amendment standard for indecent language now included speech that did not conform to accepted
standards of morality5 In certain contexts, language included in this

See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). In his concurring opinion Justice Harlan
acknowledges that the 13 obscenity cases have contained a total of 55 separate opinions. Id. at
705 n.1. Justice Stewart's famous quote, in reference to hard-core pornography, aptly describes
the Court's struggle in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring): "I
know it when I see it."
35. 403 U.S. at 26. The Court recognized the dual function of some linguistic expressions,
which "convey not only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise
inexpressible emotions as well." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
39. Id. at 729. The monologue, delivered by humorist George Carlin, and entitled "Filthy
Words," consisted of repetitions of words the humorist asserted could never be said in public.
Id. The Court agreed with the FCC that the language was 'patently offensive, though not
necessarily obscene." See id. at 729, 739-41.
40. Id. at 730.
41. Id. at 729-31, 731 n.2.
42. Id. at 731 n.2.
43. Justice Stevens wrote the opinion of the Court (Parts I, II, III, and IV-C) in which
the Chief Justice and Justices Rehnquist, Powell and Blackmun joined, and an opinion (Parts
IV-A and IV-B) in which the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 729.
44. 438 U.S. at 740. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968), the Court upheld
a state's lower standard for defining obscenity when applied to minors. But see Erznoznik v.
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (children not subject to a special standard for offensive displays).
45. 438 U.S. at 740.
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definition was just as undeserving of first amendment protection as

obscenity. 46 The plurality also implied that indecent words, no matter
how or where conveyed, deserve less constitutional protection than
political speech. 47 The plurality in Pacifica ignored the concerns unascertainable standards and chilling effects - held controlling in
Cohen.

In his dissent, Justice Brennan chastised the plurality for its disregard of the Cohen rationales for protecting offensive speech.48 He
faulted the Court for ignoring the constitutionally protected interests
of persons, including minors, wishing to receive a broadcast that some
found offensive. 49 Justice Brennan stressed that the Court had previously protected children only from obscene materials. 50Extending this
prohibition to include indecent language ignored the Court's own precedent. 51
In the instant case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its stance in
Pacifica of protecting minors from indecent language52 In Pacifica,
the Court's perception of airwaves as intrusive justified its broadening
the definition of "indecent."-' In the instant case, the Court portrayed
the public school system as an inappropriate environment for offensive
speech.-- The Court emphasized that the primary purpose of a school
is to inculcate society's fundamental values into its students. While
such values include tolerance of divergent and unpopular views, those
fundamental values also include the teaching of socially acceptable

46. Id. at 747.
47. See id. at 745-51. Two members of the plurality, Justices Powell and Blackmun, refused
to accept Justice Stevens' lower value approach to indecent speech. Id. at 761. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Powell cited commercial speech as the only exception where a lower value
theory may apply. Id. at 761 n.3. Justice Powell also asserted that it is up to the individual,
not a judge, to decide whether one form of protected speech has more or less value than other
forms of protected speech. Id.
48. Id. at 773.
49. Id. at 766.
50. Id. at 767. Justice Brennan cited to Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) for
the proposition that children were subject to a variation on the adult standard for obscenity.
438 U.S. at 767 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The variable standard, however, still calls for the
materials to be significantly erotic.
51. Id. at 767-68; see also Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (children not
subject to a special standard for offensive, but not obscene, displays).
52. See 106 S. Ct. at 3165.
53. See 438 U.S. at 740.
54. 106 S. Ct. at 3164-65.
55. Id.; see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982); Ambach v. Norvick,
441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969).
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behavior.- Therefore, the school's range of permissible duties included
prohibiting language offensive to others. 57
While not denying that school children have first amendment rights,
the instant Court distinguished the armband protest in Tinker 5 from
respondent's speech by noting that respondent's actions were unrelated
to any political viewpoint5 9 The Court also distinguished the Tinker
protest as passive, while the respondent's speech was disruptive.6°
Further, the Court characterized the instant speech as similar to the
monologue in Pacifica6l and to fighting words,6 2 both unprotected by
the first amendment63 The Court also declared that respondent's
speech intruded on a young and unconsenting audience.64 By sanctioning the student for his offensive speech, the school fulfilled its proper
role in society and protected the rights of other students.6
In his concurring opinion, Justice Brennan agreed that school officials have a legitimate interest in ensuring orderly assemblies.r Justice
Brennan noted, however, that the language in the student's speech
was not similar to the indecent speech banned in Pacifica.67 Because
respondent's language was not obscene, lewd, or vulgar, the instant
speech deserved first amendment protection.6 Therefore, had respon-

56. 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
57. Id. at 3165.
58. Id. at 3163.
59. Id. at 3166. The Tinker students expressed a political viewpoint, which however unpopular, was deserving of constitutional protection. Id.
60. Id. at 3168-69. In his dissent, Justice Marshall questioned whether the assembly's
reaction to the speech, and the fact that one teacher had to devote part of the class time to an
explanation of the speech, demonstrated any disruption of the educational process. Id. at 3168;
see also Fraser v. Bethel, 755 F.2d 1356, 1360 (9th Cir. 1985) (school counselor testified that
student reaction to respondent's speech was not atypical to the usual high school assembly),
revd, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986).
61. 106 S. Ct. at 3165. The Court described respondent's speech as vulgar, lewd, and
indecent, id. at 3166, as compared to the "obscene, indecent, and profane" broadcast in Pacifica,
438 U.S. at 738.
62. 106 S. Ct. at 3166 (fighting words comparison focused on the lack of social value in
speech).
63. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
64. 106 S. Ct. at 3166.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3167. Schools also have a high interest in controlling activities that are part of
the school curriculum and that are seen as being endorsed by the school. See Seyfried v. Walton,
668 F.2d 214, 216 (3d Cir. 1981) (school play subject to censorship as its sexual content would
be viewed as being endorsed by the school).
67. 106 S. Ct. at 3168 n.2.
68. Id.
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dent delivered the speech where the school's interest in preventing
the disruption of assemblies was not as strong, respondent's claim
would be sustained. 69
An analysis of the instant case must begin with the recognition
that schools are justified in discouraging student conduct that disrupts
the educational process. The Supreme Court has balanced this interest
in control with the free speech rights of students. Children, however,
are often not granted the same first amendment rights extended to
adults.7 0 Thus, a school may not have to demonstrate a compelling
interest to impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
offensive expression. The instant Court noted that even during vigorous political debates in a legislature, rules prohibit the use of language
offensive to others.71 Yet the Court acknowledged in Cohen that the
Constitution protects the emotive value of words as well as the words
themselves.72 While the speech in the instant case may not have contained pure political speech attributes found in Tinker, respondent
delivered the speech in a political context. Respondent's choice of
words achieved the goal of any political speaker: attention and reaction
to his cause and candidates. Respondent's language was also significantly less offensive than that used in Cohen since respondent used no
obscene words and instead relied on sexual innuendo.73
A school may also have an interest in shielding a captive student
audience when it restricts offensive speech.7 4 The instant Court emphasized its concern, voiced in Pacifica, that indecent speech thrust
on an unwilling audience was potentially damaging to that audience. v5
The broadcast in Pacifica intruded into the home, where unwilling
audiences were historically protected.76 When that same unwilling audience encountered indecent speech in a courthouse, the Court directed

69. Id. at 3168. Justice Stevens echoes this assertion in his dissent, stating that the same
speech given in a locker room or school corridor, "might be regarded as rather routine comment."
Id. at 3171.
70. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 637 (1968) (lower standard for juveniles
in obscenity cases); Nicholson v. Board of Educ. Torrance Unified School Dist., 682 F.2d 858,
(9th Cir. 1982) (writers on high school newspaper subject to pre-publication review).
71. 106 S. Ct. at 3164.
72. 403 U.S. at 26.
73. Compare 106 S. Ct. at 3167 with Cohen, 403 U.S. at 16 (respondent's speech did not
contain the explicitly indecent word, i.e., "fuck," found in Cohen).
74. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (state may protect captive audience
from offensive speech).
75. 106 S. Ct. at 3165. The Court asserts that respondent's speech was especially insulting
to teenage girl students. Id.
76. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970).
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them to avert their eyes.7 Correspondingly, a school falls somewhere

between the home and the public.7 The restrictions a school places
on students' movements during school hours appear similar to

Pacifica's unwilling audience. In the instant case, however, the students were attending a voluntary assembly, implying that they were
not a captive audience in need of protection. 71
The instant majority does not adequately distinguish the high school
audience in the instant case from the young child in Pacifica. High
school students old enough to participate in an assembly on self-government are mature enough to hear sexual innuendoes used to emphasize a candidate's attributes.80 Pacifica denied even consenting
adults the right to listen to the broadcast at issue during the day.
Thus, according to Pacifica, the presence of even one immature student at the assembly where the instant speech was given would be
enough to prohibit such a speech. Yet Pacifica allowed the station to
broadcast the offending material at a later time when children would
be asleep, acknowledging implicitly that the speech itself was protected. The instant Court, on the other hand, asserts that respondent's
language is inappropriate anywhere in the school environment, and
implicitly in society as well.sl
The school's focus on the inappropriate content of respondent's

77.

Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.

78. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) (university may have greater
array of time, place, and manner restrictions than would be allowed to other types of forums);
Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973) (because of the state's interest in education,
the level of disturbance required to justify official intervention is relatively lower in a public
school than on a street corner).
79. One court refused to accept that mandatory attendance at school alone established the
kind of captive audience that required constitutional protection. Gambino v. Fairfax City School
Bd., 429 F. Supp. 731, 736 (E.D. Va. 1977).
80. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 548 (3d Cir. 1984)
(court considered level of maturity of high school students in deciding whether to allow a student
religious group to meet during school day); Seyfried v. Walton, 668 F.2d at 219 (Rosenn, J.,
concurring) ("the court can take judicial notice of the progressively higher levels of intellectual
and emotional development of students in the later grades of secondary school"); see also Bethel
School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. at 3169-70 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When a
more orthodox message is being conveyed [to high school students], four members of today's
majority would treat [them] like college students. . . ."); cf. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
643 (1979) (a high school student may demonstrate sufficient maturity to decide to have an
abortion without parental consent). But cf. Diamond, supra note 23, at 490 (abortion is a unique
circumstance, distinguishable from freedom of expression, and minors as a class cannot make
abortion decision).
81. 106 S. Ct. at 3165. The Court's assertion that schools must teach students socially
acceptable behavior implies that behavior inappropriate in school is inappropriate in society as
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speech should be subject to strict scrutiny by the Court." The instant

majority instead holds that respondent's speech is unprotected by the
first amendment, a significant departure from the principles announced
in Pacifica. For example, the language in the instant speech was not

sexually explicit nor did it include any words termed vulgar in the
Pacifica monologue. Sexual metaphors and double entendres, similar
to those in respondent's speech, are present in literature acceptable
to high school curricula.8 Yet the instant Court describes respondent's
innuendoes as lewd, vulgar, and indecent speech,", echoing the Pacifica
Court's description of much more explicit language86

Ultimately, the instant Court emphasized the teaching of moral
rather than political values1s In Tinker, the Court directed schools to

well. The Court also states that respondent's speech was 'plainly offensive to both teachers
and students - indeed to any mature person." Id.
82. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980) (first amendment hostility to content-based regulations of speech allows such regulations to be approved
only in the narrowest circumstances); see also Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462
F.2d 960, 971 (5th Cir. 1972) (school board has heavier burden of demonstrating reasonableness
of restrictions imposed on student speech if its decision is based upon the content of materials
that are not obscene).
83. 106 S. Ct. at 3168 n.2. Justice Brennan points out in his concurring opinion that respondent's language was "no more 'obscene,' 'lewd' or 'sexually explicit' than the bulk of the programs
currently appearing on prime time television or in the local cinema." Id.
84. Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew, taught in at least one high school curriculum,
contains the following passage rife with sexual innuendoes:
Petruchio. Come, Come, you wasp; i' faith you are too angry.
Katharina. If I be waspish best beware my sting.
Petruchio. My remedy is then to pluck it out.
Katharina. Ay, if the fool could find it where it lies.
Petruchio. Who knows not where a wasp does wear his sting? In his tail.
Katharina. In his tongue.
Petruchio. Whose tongue?
Katharina. Yours, if you talk of tails; and so farewell.
Petruchio. What! with my tongue in your tail? nay, come again. Good Kate, I am
a gentleman.
Katharina. That I'll try.
W. SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act II, scene i, lines 209-17 (New Cambridge
ed. 1984); cf Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir. 1969) (teacher discussing origin of
"motherfucker" with students is not disciplined as word is found in five books in the school
library); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools, 306 F. Supp. 1388, 1395-96 (E.D. Mich. 1969)
(student protected from disciplinary action for reading tabloid with four letter words because
same words found in required reading in curriculum).
85. 106 S. Ct. at 3165.
86. 438 U.S. at 747.
87. But cf. Wallace v. Jaffre, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985) (state cannot be instrument for fostering
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prepare students for participation in a democracy by respecting freedom of expression. In the instant case, the school must also teach
students its perception of socially acceptable behavior. The Court provides no constitutional standard that will guide schools in determining
what speech or behavior is appropriate. Instead, the Court permits
schools to act according to their discretion in sanctioning a student
for speech deemed inappropriate and offensive.8
By giving schools broad discretion, the instant Court ignores its
own warnings of the chilling effects inherent in prohibiting speech
offensive to some members of society9 Although a school needs stricter rules than society at large, prior to the instant case, schools were

required to respect children's constitutional rights. 9 1 All the opinions

in the instant case recognized that a school has a high interest in
maintaining an undisturbed environment 92 and must be accorded some
degree of discretion. 93 Yet unlike previous decisions addressing chil-

dren's first amendment rights, the majority avoids relying on a con-

public adherence to ideological viewpoint unacceptable to individual); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421 (1962) (schools cannot be the inculcators of religious values). Arguably, the Court's decision
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) allows the parents, rather than the schools, to be
the teachers not only of religious values, but of wisdom and community welfare. Id. at 211.
For a discussion of the parents' role vis-d-vis the states in determining children's first amendment
rights, see Garvey, supra note 25, at 338.
88. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. at 50. But see van Geel, The Search
for Constitutional Limits on Governmental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEX. L. REv.
197, 274 (1983) (no consensus exists regarding what values or behavior students need to maintain
a democratic political system).
89. 106 S. Ct. at 3166.
90. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26.
91. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
92. 106 S. Ct. 3159. The majority asserted that the Tinker Court was "careful to note that
the case did not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the work of schools or the rights
of other students." 106 S. Ct. at 3163. Justice Brennan noted, "It is true, however, that the
state has interests in teaching high school students how to conduct civil and effective public
discourse and in avoiding disruption of educational school activities." Id. at 3168 (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Justice Marshall recognized that "the school administration must be given wide
latitude to determine what forms of conduct are inconsistent with the school's educational mission
.... " Id. at 3169 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens believed "a school faculty must
regulate the content as well as the style of student speech in carrying out its educational
mission." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
93. For a discussion on the difficulty the Court has had in agreeing on the extent to which
the school's special interest may permit constitutional rights to be infringed, see Levin, Educating
Youth for Citizenship: The Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public
School, 95 YALE L.J. 1647-62 (1986).
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stitutional standard to control the school's discretion.9 Lack of such a
standard impinges on the constitutional rights of both children and
adults.95 While the Court may direct schools to inculcate society's
values, the problem remains of whose values should prevail.9
Nina Zollo

94. In a recent decision, however, the Court reduced the constitutional standard of probable
cause to one of reasonableness, to determine whether a student search by a school official
violated the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
95. See van Geel, supra note 88, at 261 ("it would make a mockery of the protection of an
adult's freedom of belief if the government could pre-condition his beliefs, by indoctrinating him
during childhood"). Arguably, the same danger could be applied to freedom of expression.
96. Even the prevailing values in society change over time. For example, when Justice
Stevens was a high school student, Clark Gable's use of a four letter expletive in "Frankly, my
dear, I don't give a damn" shocked the nation. 106 S. Ct. at 3169 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Today, at least according to Justice Stevens, who is in the minority in the instant case, the
word is much less offensive. Id.
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